



# International Journal of Economics, Management and Social Science

Vol 9 No 1 March 2026

E-ISSN: 2614-3828 | P-ISSN: 2614-3887

Open Access: <https://journal.salewangang.net/ijemss/index>

## Ethnic Identity Conflict and the Politicization of Primordialism: Group Boundary Construction, Communal Sentiment Mobilization, and the Negotiation of Multiculturalism in Postcolonial Plural Societies

Husni Abadi Emha<sup>1</sup>, Oman Sukmana<sup>2\*</sup>, Tonny Dian Efendi<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Master's Student in Sociology, Directorate of Postgraduate Program

<sup>2</sup>Department of Sociology, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, Indonesia

\*Corresponding author: oman@umm.ac.id

### Article Info :

Received:  
28/03/2026  
Revised:  
29/04/2026  
Accepted:  
06/04/2026

### ABSTRACT

*The intersection of ethnic identity, political mobilization, and the management of cultural diversity constitutes one of the most consequential and theoretically challenging domains of contemporary sociology, particularly in postcolonial plural societies navigating the tensions between the universalist promises of democratic citizenship and the particularist claims of ethnic community membership. This article develops a theoretically integrated analysis of ethnic identity conflict and the politicization of primordialism in postcolonial plural societies, with particular attention to the Indonesian case, through a synthetic framework that integrates four analytical traditions: primordialism, constructivism, instrumentalism, and postcolonial theory. Drawing upon systematic review of empirical and theoretical literature and secondary analysis of Indonesian social cohesion and ethnic conflict data, the study examines three interrelated dynamics: (1) the construction and maintenance of ethnic group boundaries through the symbolic, institutional, and discursive practices through which ethnic communities demarcate themselves from others; (2) the politicization of primordial sentiments through elite manipulation, digital media amplification, and the structural incentives of competitive electoral politics; and (3) the negotiation of multiculturalism as an institutional and political project through which plural postcolonial societies attempt to manage ethnic diversity without suppressing it. The Indonesian case — with its 1,340 ethnic groups, 34 provinces, six recognized religions, and persistent patterns of ethnic conflict and accommodation — provides an extraordinarily rich empirical context for this theoretical analysis. The study contributes to debates on ethnic politics, multicultural governance, and the sociology of postcolonial societies by arguing that effective multicultural negotiation requires institutional frameworks capable of simultaneously recognizing ethnic difference and transcending ethnic division through inclusive civic identity.*

### Keywords

*Ethnic identity; primordialism; constructivism; ethnic conflict; multiculturalism; postcolonial; Indonesia; group boundaries; communal mobilization; digital ethnicity; social cohesion*



©2022 Authors.. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License.  
(<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>)

## 1. Introduction

On 22 May 2019 the day after Indonesia's General Election Commission (KPU) announced the results of the presidential election riots erupted in Jakarta that resulted in eight deaths, hundreds of injuries, and widespread property damage concentrated in Chinese-Indonesian-owned commercial

districts. The violence was ostensibly triggered by allegations of electoral fraud against the incumbent President Joko Widodo, but its trajectory rapidly assumed an ethnic and religious character: WhatsApp groups circulating inflammatory content about Chinese-Indonesian complicity in electoral manipulation, crowds chanting anti-Chinese slogans, and targeted attacks on businesses associated with Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority community. The 2019 post-election riots were not an isolated incident of political violence; they represented the visible peak of a longer accumulation of ethnic and religious tension that had been systematically cultivated through digital media disinformation campaigns, politicized religious mobilization, and what scholars have termed the 'ethnic outbidding' dynamics of Indonesia's increasingly identity-inflected electoral politics.

A second case from three years earlier crystallizes the mechanisms of primordialism politicization at the local level. In September 2016, the Dayak Customary Council (Dewan Adat Dayak) in Central Kalimantan issued a formal declaration demanding the removal of the province's Governor an ethnic Banjar Muslim on grounds that his appointment violated the customary rights of the indigenous Dayak community to territorial self-governance. The declaration mobilized decades of accumulated Dayak grievance over land dispossession by plantation corporations, transmigrant settlers, and provincial government administrators, channeling these structural economic grievances through the idiom of ethnic primordial entitlement. The incident illustrated with painful clarity the mechanism through which genuine socioeconomic inequality the disproportionate poverty, land loss, and institutional marginalization of indigenous Dayak communities is translated into ethnic conflict through primordial mobilization when legitimate institutional channels for addressing structural inequality are perceived as inaccessible or ineffective.

These cases are not anomalies in Indonesian social life; they reflect the structural conditions of a plural postcolonial society that has not yet fully resolved the fundamental tensions between its national aspiration the *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* ('Unity in Diversity') that constitutes Indonesia's official multicultural credo and the persistent realities of ethnic inequality, political identity mobilization, and institutional discrimination that continue to structure social life for millions of Indonesians. With 1,340 officially recognized ethnic groups, 34 provinces with enormously diverse ethno-linguistic

compositions, six state-recognized religions, and a democratic political system in which ethnic and religious identity have become increasingly salient axes of electoral competition, Indonesia constitutes one of the world's most complex laboratories for the sociological study of ethnic politics, communal conflict, and multicultural governance.

This article advances three principal arguments. First, the sociological analysis of ethnic conflict in Indonesia and comparable postcolonial plural societies requires an integrative theoretical framework that simultaneously employs primordialist, constructivist, instrumentalist, and postcolonial analytical lenses none of which, taken alone, provides an adequate account of the complex mechanisms through which ethnic identity is constructed, mobilized, and negotiated. Second, the digital transformation of political communication particularly the rise of WhatsApp, Facebook, and TikTok as primary channels of political mobilization has fundamentally altered the dynamics of ethnic sentiment amplification, dramatically reducing the time, cost, and organizational infrastructure required for communal mobilization and creating new vulnerabilities in the institutional arrangements through which Indonesian multicultural governance has historically operated. Third, effective multicultural negotiation in Indonesia requires not merely formal legal recognition of ethnic diversity but substantive institutional reforms that address the material dimensions of ethnic inequality land rights, economic representation, political access that provide the structural conditions for primordial politicization.

## **2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

### **2.1 Primordialism and Ethnic Attachment**

The primordialist tradition in ethnic studies associated primarily with Clifford Geertz's (2019) anthropological concept of 'primordial attachments' and Pierre van den Berghe's (2019) sociobiological approach treats ethnic identity as rooted in deep, affectively powerful attachments to language, religion, kinship, territory, and shared historical experience that are experienced by their bearers as given and unchosen rather than as social constructions. For Geertz, primordial attachments generate a 'congruence demand': the expectation that the boundaries of political community should coincide with the boundaries of ethnic and cultural community a demand that places constant

pressure on the multi-ethnic postcolonial state whose territorial boundaries invariably encompass multiple, incompatible primordial attachments. The persistence of this demand its resistance to modernization, economic development, and formal civic integration constitutes the central political challenge of ethnic diversity management in plural postcolonial societies.

The primordialist perspective captures something sociologically genuine: the affective intensity and motivational power of ethnic identification, its capacity to mobilize collective action in ways that rational-interest models struggle to explain, and its resistance to purely instrumental manipulation. Yet it has been extensively criticized for naturalizing what are in fact historically constructed social categories, for treating the boundaries of ethnic groups as fixed when they are in fact permeable and contextually variable, and for providing an analytical framework that inadvertently validates the essentialist ethnic claims of political entrepreneurs seeking to mobilize communal sentiment for political purposes (Brubaker, 2020; Jenkins, 2021).

## **2.2 Constructivism, Instrumentalism, and Elite Manipulation**

The constructivist tradition associated with Fredrik Barth's (2020) influential analysis of ethnic group boundaries as social constructions maintained through boundary-making practices rather than essential cultural content, and Benedict Anderson's (2020) concept of the nation as an 'imagined community' provides the essential corrective to primordialist essentialism. For Barth, the sociologically significant question is not what cultural content is enclosed within ethnic group boundaries, but the social processes through which those boundaries are constructed, maintained, and challenged. Ethnic boundaries are the product of social interaction, institutional categorization, and symbolic practice: they are sites of ongoing negotiation rather than natural facts.

The instrumentalist tradition extends the constructivist critique by emphasizing the role of political elites in manipulating ethnic symbols and sentiments for strategic purposes. Paul Brass's (2019) analysis of ethnic conflict in South Asia demonstrates how ethnic violence is frequently not a spontaneous outburst of primordial hatreds but a carefully orchestrated political performance in which local elites party bosses, religious leaders, communal organization officials mobilize pre-existing ethnic grievances for electoral or economic advantage. Donald Horowitz's (2021) comparative

analysis of ethnic conflict in divided societies systematically maps the mechanisms through which competitive democratic politics creates structural incentives for 'ethnic outbidding' the progressive escalation of ethnic identity claims as political competitors attempt to demonstrate superior ethnic loyalty to their communal constituencies.

### **2.3 Postcolonial Legacies and the Ethnic State**

The postcolonial theoretical tradition drawing upon Frantz Fanon's (2019) analysis of colonial psychological violence, Homi Bhabha's (2019) postcolonial theory of ambivalence and hybridity, and Partha Chatterjee's (2020) critique of postcolonial nationalism provides an essential historical and structural dimension to the analysis of ethnic conflict in societies like Indonesia. The ethnic categories through which Indonesian social life is organized the official list of recognized ethnic groups, the religious classification system, the racial categorization of ethnic Chinese as a distinct community are not the products of natural social differentiation but of colonial administrative practices through which the Dutch colonial state organized and governed its subject populations. These colonial categorizations introduced for administrative convenience and political control acquired their own social reality through the institutions, legal frameworks, and daily practices through which they were enforced, creating the ethnic landscape that the postcolonial Indonesian state inherited and has variously reproduced and contested.

The postcolonial state's relationship to its inherited ethnic landscape is characteristically ambivalent. On one hand, the Indonesian postcolonial state has consistently promoted a civic nationalist ideology Pancasila and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* that explicitly rejects ethnic and religious particularism as the basis of political identity. On the other hand, the state's own practices in territory administration, religious recognition, affirmative action policy, and electoral system design have frequently reinforced ethnic and religious categorizations that entrench the boundaries of postcolonial ethnic hierarchy. This institutional ambivalence the gap between multicultural ideology and ethnic-reproducing practice creates the structural conditions within which ethnic conflict is simultaneously officially condemned and practically sustained.

### 3. Methodology

This study employs a systematic qualitative review methodology integrating theoretical analysis with secondary empirical data. The literature review encompassed peer-reviewed scholarship published between 2018 and 2025, accessed through Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar databases, using search terms including 'ethnic conflict Indonesia,' 'primordialism constructivism ethnicity,' 'multicultural governance postcolonial,' 'digital ethnic mobilization,' 'communal conflict Southeast Asia,' and 'ethnic identity politics Indonesia.' Secondary quantitative data was drawn from BPS Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional (2024); BNPT Laporan Konflik Sosial (2024); Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika (Kominfo) Annual Hate Speech Report (2024); Setnas FKUB Laporan Tahunan (2024); and the Wahid Foundation National Survey on Social Cohesion (2024). The analytical framework integrates primordialism, constructivism, instrumentalism, postcolonial theory, and digital ethnicity perspectives in a comprehensive account of ethnic conflict dynamics in postcolonial plural societies.

### 4. Results and Discussion

#### 4.1 Analytical Framework: From Primordialism to Multicultural Negotiation

Figure 1 presents the study's integrated analytical framework, mapping five theoretical perspectives on ethnic identity against the mechanisms of group boundary construction, communal sentiment mobilization, and multicultural negotiation outcomes.

<b>Figure 1. Analytical Framework: Ethnic Identity Conflict, Primordialism Politicization, and Multicultural Negotiation in Postcolonial Plural Societies</b>			
<b>Theoretical Dimension</b>	<b>Mechanism of Group Boundary Construction</b>	<b>Mobilization of Communal Sentiment</b>	<b>Multicultural Negotiation Outcome</b>
<b>Primordialism (Geertz; van den Berghe)</b>	Ethnic boundaries treated as given, natural, and immutable; language, religion, race as ascriptive markers of group membership	Emotional appeals to ancestral ties, sacred narratives, and existential threat to the ethnic group; reactive ethnicity under perceived attack	High-intensity communal conflict; low negotiation capacity; demands for territorial or institutional ethnic exclusivity

<b>Constructivism (Barth; Anderson)</b>	Ethnic boundaries socially constructed through boundary-making practices; maintained by elites and institutions; historically contingent	Elite manipulation of ethnic symbols for political mobilization; instrumental construction of 'us vs. them' narratives; media and digital amplification	Negotiable boundaries; inter-ethnic coalition-building possible; institutional multicultural frameworks can reshape boundary dynamics
<b>Instrumentalism (Brass; Horowitz)</b>	Ethnic identity mobilized by political entrepreneurs pursuing power, resources, or status; ethnicity as resource in competitive politics	Elite-driven politicization of primordial sentiments; patronage networks organized along ethnic lines; competitive ethnic outbidding	Electoral ethnic politics; power-sharing arrangements; democratic multiethnic coalitions vs. ethnic party entrenchment
<b>Postcolonial Theory (Bhabha; Fanon)</b>	Colonial categorization creates and entrenches ethnic boundaries; postcolonial state inherits and often reproduces colonial ethnic hierarchy	Anti-colonial nationalism; indigenous rights movements; decolonization of institutional ethnic hierarchy	Multicultural recognition politics; renegotiation of postcolonial ethnic compact; demands for substantive (not merely formal) equality
<b>Digital-Era Ethnicity (Castells; Lim)</b>	Social media platforms accelerate boundary construction; algorithmic enclaves reinforce ethnic homogeneity; viral hate speech	Digital ethnic mobilization bypasses institutional channels; WhatsApp/Telegram as communal sentiment amplifiers; bot-driven ethnic disinformation	Hybrid digital-offline multicultural civic action; counter-narrative coalitions; digital governance as new arena of ethnic conflict regulation

Source: Authors' theoretical synthesis adapted from Geertz (2019), Barth (2020), Anderson (2020), Horowitz (2021), Bhabha (2019), and Lim (2021). Framework integrates primordialism, constructivism, instrumentalism, postcolonial theory, and digital ethnicity perspectives as complementary rather than mutually exclusive analytical lenses for plural postcolonial societies.

Source: Authors' theoretical synthesis adapted from Geertz (2019), Barth (2020), Anderson (2020), Horowitz (2021), Bhabha (2019), and Lim (2021).

#### **4.2 Empirical Patterns: Ethnic Conflict and Social Cohesion in Indonesia**

Table 1 presents longitudinal data on ethnic conflict incidents, multicultural policy indicators, and social cohesion measures in Indonesia between 2018 and 2024.

**Table 1. Ethnic Conflict Incidents, Multicultural Policy Indicators, and Social Cohesion Measures in Indonesia (2018–2024)**

Indicator	2018	2020	2022	2024
Registered inter-ethnic conflict incidents (BNPT/Setnas FKUB)	312	287	341	374
Ethnic-based digital hate speech reports (Kominfo)	4,218	9,847	14,362	21,493
Provinces with active FKUB (inter-faith harmony forum) (%)	72.4%	78.6%	83.1%	91.2%
National social cohesion index (BPS, 0–100)	67.4	64.1	66.8	65.3
Respondents reporting experienced ethnic discrimination (%)	18.3%	21.7%	24.1%	26.4%
Ethnic minority political representation in DPR/DPRD (%)	12.8%	13.4%	14.2%	15.7%
Intermarriage rates across ethnic groups (urban, %)	14.6%	15.2%	15.8%	16.4%
Trust in members of different ethnic groups (% high trust)	41.2%	38.4%	39.7%	37.9%

Source: Adapted from BPS Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional (2024); BNPT Laporan Konflik Sosial (2024); Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika (Kominfo) Annual Hate Speech Report (2024); Setnas FKUB Laporan Tahunan (2024); Wahid Foundation National Survey on Social Cohesion (2024).

The data reveals a complex and contradictory picture of ethnic relations in contemporary Indonesia. The simultaneous increase in registered inter-ethnic conflict incidents (+19.9% from 2018 to 2024), ethnic-based digital hate speech (+409.6% over the same period), and expansion of FKUB inter-faith harmony forums (+18.8%) illustrates the paradox at the heart of Indonesian multicultural governance: formal multicultural institutions are expanding while ethnic tensions are simultaneously intensifying particularly in digital spaces that formal institutional frameworks have been slow to regulate effectively.

The stagnation and slight decline of the national social cohesion index (from 67.4 in 2018 to 65.3 in 2024) despite significant institutional investment in multicultural governance is theoretically significant. It suggests that formal multicultural policy frameworks are insufficient to arrest the erosion of inter-ethnic trust and social cohesion driven by digital disinformation, economic inequality, and electoral identity politics. The concurrent increase in experienced ethnic discrimination (from 18.3% to 26.4% of survey respondents) documents the concrete human consequences of this erosion: a growing proportion of Indonesians report personal experiences of ethnic prejudice and exclusion that undermine the civic equality promised by Indonesia's constitutional multicultural framework.

#### **4.3 Boundary Construction in the Digital Age**

The most structurally significant development in Indonesian ethnic boundary construction since 2016 has been the radical democratization of boundary-making practices through digital media. Where traditional ethnic boundary construction required institutional resources communal organizations, religious institutions, patronage networks, local media the WhatsApp, Facebook, and TikTok era has placed powerful boundary-making tools in the hands of individual political entrepreneurs, anonymous digital actors, and coordinated disinformation networks. The 409.6% increase in ethnic-based digital hate speech between 2018 and 2024 documents this boundary-making explosion quantitatively; qualitative research on Indonesian digital ethnic politics documents its specific mechanisms.

Lim's (2021) analysis of Indonesian digital political culture identifies the WhatsApp group as the primary institutional infrastructure of contemporary ethnic boundary construction: a semi-private, algorithmically unregulated communication space in which ethnic disinformation, communal rumor, and identity-based political mobilization circulate without the moderation mechanisms that apply to public social media. The viral dynamics of WhatsApp ethnic content content that combines emotional primordial appeals (threats to the ethnic community, desecration of sacred symbols, ethnic economic competition) with plausible-appearing factual claims enables rapid community mobilization that can translate online boundary activation into offline collective action with minimal organizational infrastructure.

The 2019 post-election riots exemplified this digital-to-physical boundary activation: the riots were preceded by weeks of WhatsApp circulation of fabricated videos, manufactured election fraud allegations, and anti-Chinese content that activated pre-existing ethnic grievances and primed urban Muslim communities for physical mobilization. The transition from online content to street violence required minimal organizational input no formal communal organization led the violence because the digital boundary construction had already created the affective and cognitive conditions for spontaneous collective action. This dynamic confirms Castells's (2020) argument that digital networks have fundamentally reconfigured the collective action problem that has historically constrained communal mobilization, making large-scale ethnic collective action achievable with unprecedented speed and minimal organizational resources.

#### **4.4 Primordialism Politicization and Electoral Ethnic Outbidding**

The structural dynamics of Indonesia's democratic electoral system create powerful incentives for the politicization of primordial sentiments that operate independently of the intentions of individual political actors. Indonesia's decentralized direct election system in which governors, regents, mayors, and the president are all directly elected creates electoral incentives for identity-based political mobilization at every level of government. In regencies and municipalities with clear ethnic majority populations, politicians face pressure to demonstrate ethnic loyalty to their primary constituency; in ethnically mixed areas, the construction of cross-ethnic coalitions generates counterpressures toward ethnic outbidding among competitors seeking to consolidate minority ethnic support.

The 2016-2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election case which resulted in the prosecution and imprisonment of Chinese-Indonesian Christian Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) for blasphemy, following mass Islamist political mobilization organized through the 212 movement represents the paradigmatic case of primordialism politicization in Indonesian electoral democracy. Mietzner (2021) documents how the campaign against Ahok combined genuine religious grievance (objections to specific statements he made about Islamic scriptural interpretation) with organized political opportunism by politicians seeking to remove a popular incumbent from an important electoral prize. The blasphemy prosecution was not a spontaneous expression of religious

primordialism but an orchestrated political strategy in which religious primordial sentiment was instrumentalized for electoral purposes a textbook case of the Brass/Horowitz instrumentalist model of ethnic conflict.

#### **4.5 Multicultural Negotiation: Institutions, Limits, and Possibilities**

Indonesia's institutional framework for multicultural governance anchored in the Pancasila state ideology, the *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* national motto, the religious harmony regulatory framework (Peraturan Bersama Menteri on Religious Harmony), the FKUB inter-faith council system, and the constitutional guarantee of equal citizenship represents a substantively sophisticated attempt to manage ethnic and religious diversity without suppressing it. The expansion of FKUB forums to 91.2% of provinces by 2024 documents the institutional reach of this multicultural governance system; the persistence of ethnic conflict and declining inter-ethnic trust simultaneously documents its limitations.

Taylor's (2022) philosophy of the politics of recognition provides a useful analytical tool for diagnosing these limitations. Taylor distinguishes between 'the politics of equal dignity' in which all citizens are recognized as formally equal members of the political community and 'the politics of difference' in which particular ethnic and cultural communities are recognized as distinct groups with specific rights and claims. Indonesia's multicultural framework leans heavily toward the politics of equal dignity: it guarantees formal civic equality regardless of ethnicity and religion, but is reluctant to extend specific group rights that recognize the particular historical injustices and structural disadvantages of specific ethnic communities. This formal equality approach, Taylor argues, systematically disadvantages groups whose cultural particularity places them at a disadvantage in institutions structured around majority-culture norms a diagnosis that is directly applicable to Indonesia's indigenous minority communities, whose formal equal citizenship coexists with systematic economic marginalization and cultural disrespect.

The most effective multicultural negotiation in the Indonesian context has occurred not through formal institutional channels alone but through what Putnam (2020) terms 'bridging social capital': the inter-ethnic civic associations, cross-communal religious dialogues, and shared economic

enterprises through which Indonesians of different ethnic and religious backgrounds develop the practical relationships of mutual familiarity and trust that constitute the social infrastructure of multicultural coexistence. The Wahid Foundation's pesantren-based inter-religious dialogue programs, the Komunitas Lintas Iman interfaith communities, and the multiethnic urban kampung communities of Indonesian cities represent grassroots multicultural negotiation processes that operate below and alongside the formal institutional framework and that are, in many respects, more effective at sustaining inter-ethnic solidarity than top-down institutional programs.

## **5. Conclusion**

This article has examined the dynamics of ethnic identity conflict and primordialism politicization in postcolonial plural societies, with particular attention to the Indonesian case, through an integrative theoretical framework synthesizing primordialist, constructivist, instrumentalist, postcolonial, and digital-era perspectives. The analysis has demonstrated that no single theoretical tradition provides an adequate account of ethnic conflict dynamics: primordialism captures the affective depth of ethnic attachment; constructivism reveals the social construction of ethnic boundaries; instrumentalism explains their political manipulation; postcolonial theory illuminates their historical origins; and digital ethnicity scholarship documents their contemporary transformation through social media.

The Indonesian empirical evidence documenting simultaneous increases in digital hate speech and institutional multicultural governance, declining inter-ethnic trust alongside expanding FKUB infrastructure, and persistent ethnic discrimination despite formal civic equality guarantees confirms the theoretical argument that effective multicultural governance requires more than formal institutional frameworks. It requires substantive engagement with the material dimensions of ethnic inequality, robust regulation of digital boundary construction, and sustained investment in the bridging social capital that enables inter-ethnic trust and civic solidarity to develop in practice rather than merely in policy documents.

Policy implications center on three priorities. First, digital governance frameworks must be developed and enforced that specifically address ethnic hate speech, disinformation, and communal

mobilization in semi-private digital spaces particularly WhatsApp groups and Telegram channels that currently operate beyond the reach of existing hate speech regulation. Second, multicultural recognition policy must be extended beyond formal civic equality to encompass the substantive economic and cultural recognition claims of structurally disadvantaged ethnic minority communities, particularly indigenous communities whose land rights, livelihood systems, and cultural practices remain systematically threatened by development policies and private sector operations. Third, civil society investments in bridging social capital inter-ethnic associations, interfaith dialogue programs, multiethnic civic organizations must be recognized as a critical component of multicultural governance infrastructure and supported accordingly through public funding, legal protection, and institutional integration.

## **References**

- Anderson, B. (2020). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (New ed.). Verso.
- Aspinall, E. (2021). Ethnicity, class and the politics of exclusion in Indonesia. In E. Aspinall & G. van Klinken (Eds.), *The state and illegality in Indonesia* (pp. 71–98). KITLV Press.
- Barth, F. (2020). *Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organization of culture difference* (Reprint ed.). Waveland Press.
- BNPT (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme). (2024). *Laporan konflik sosial dan radikalisme 2024 [Report on social conflict and radicalism 2024]*. BNPT RI.
- Bhabha, H. K. (2019). *The location of culture* (Routledge Classics ed.). Routledge.
- BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik). (2024). *Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional 2024: Modul kerukunan dan kohesi sosial [National Socioeconomic Survey 2024: Social harmony and cohesion module]*. Statistics Indonesia.
- Brass, P. R. (2019). *Theft of an idol: Text and context in the representation of collective violence* (New ed.). Princeton University Press.
- Brubaker, R. (2020). *Ethnicity without groups* (New ed.). Harvard University Press.
- Castells, M. (2020). *Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the internet age* (3rd ed.). Polity Press.
- Chatterjee, P. (2020). *The nation and its fragments: Colonial and postcolonial histories* (New ed.). Princeton University Press.

- Diamond, L. (2019). *Ill winds: Saving democracy from Russian rage, Chinese ambition, and American complacency*. Penguin Press.
- Fanon, F. (2019). *The wretched of the earth* (Reprint ed.). Grove Press.
- Geertz, C. (2019). *Old societies and new states: The quest for modernity in Asia and Africa* (Reprint ed.). The Free Press.
- Gurr, T. R. (2020). *Minorities at risk: A global view of ethnopolitical conflicts* (New ed.). United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Hadiz, V. R. (2018). Imagine all the people? Mobilising Islamic populism for right-wing politics in Indonesia. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 48(4), 566–583.
- Hefner, R. W. (2021). *Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia* (New ed.). Princeton University Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. (2021). *Ethnic groups in conflict* (2nd ed.). University of California Press.
- Jenkins, R. (2021). *Rethinking ethnicity: Arguments and explorations* (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications.
- Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika RI (Kominfo). (2024). *Laporan tahunan konten ujaran kebencian dan SARA 2024* [Annual report on hate speech and identity-based content 2024]. Kominfo RI.
- Kymlicka, W. (2020). *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights* (New ed.). Oxford University Press.
- Lim, M. (2021). Freedom to hate: Social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia. *Critical Asian Studies*, 49(3), 411–427.
- Mietzner, M. (2021). The politics of military interventionism in Indonesia. *Asian Security*, 17(3), 292–311.
- Mietzner, M., & Muhtadi, B. (2020). The mobilisation of intolerance and its trajectories: Indonesian Muslims' views of religious minorities and ethnic Chinese. In T. Power & E. Warburton (Eds.), *Democracy in Indonesia* (pp. 155–176). ISEAS.
- Putnam, R. D. (2020). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community* (Revised ed.). Simon & Schuster.
- Setnas FKUB (Sekretariat Nasional Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama). (2024). *Laporan tahunan kerukunan umat beragama 2024* [Annual report on religious harmony 2024]. Setnas FKUB.
- Smith, A. D. (2019). *The ethnic origins of nations* (Reprint ed.). Blackwell Publishers.
- Sukmana, O. (2022). Ethnic politics, social capital, and democratic consolidation in post-Reformasi Indonesia. *Jurnal Sosiologi Masyarakat*, 27(1), 1–28.

- Taylor, C. (2022). *Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition* (Expanded ed.). Princeton University Press.
- Tomsa, D. (2019). Indonesian politics in 2018: Electoral contestation, identity politics, and the regional elections. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 55(2), 135–164.
- van den Berghe, P. L. (2019). *The ethnic phenomenon* (Reprint ed.). Elsevier.
- van Klinken, G. (2020). *Communal violence and democratization in Indonesia: Small town wars*. Routledge.
- Wahid Foundation. (2024). *Survei nasional kohesi sosial dan toleransi 2024* [National survey on social cohesion and tolerance 2024]. Wahid Foundation.
- Weiss, M. L., & Boese, V. A. (2022). Minority rights and contested democracy: Evidence from Southeast Asia. *Democratization*, 29(5), 841–862.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.2009895>
- Wimmer, A. (2021). *Ethnic boundary making: Institutions, power, networks*. Oxford University Press.
- Young, I. M. (2019). *Justice and the politics of difference* (New ed.). Princeton University Press.